SUMMARY - "PIG":
The Contrarian's View is published 11 times per year on a mostly-irregular schedule, and the views expressed are those of the author and editor, Nick Chase. Because nobody can predict the future, results of past suggestions or recommendations are no guarantee of future results. Material in this publication may be freely quoted provided proper attribution is given to its source. Subscription rate: Free on the Internet through the World-Wide Web service at Assumption College. Using your favorite Web-browsing program, Open URL http://nick.assumption.edu. Mailed paper subscriptions, one year for $39 to The Contrarian's View, 132 Moreland Street, Worcester, Massachusetts 01609. There is a limit of 50 paid subscribers at one time; please check for availability before sending any money. Sorry, Visa and Mastercard are not available. Overseas subscription rate, U.S. $54. Unsolicited material sent to us by UPS or by courier other than the postal service is refused and returned to sender! Phone: (508) 757-2881
But it did get me thinking..... it does seem to me that "investing", if the current bubblemania-induced momentum-chasing games can really be called such.... appears to be heavily dominated by males.
Looking at the media: Permabull Abby Joseph Cohen stands out as the predominant female; otherwise most representatives of Wall Street firms who appear on TV are males.
In Barron's itself, each week at least one money manager is interviewed; only occasionally is the interviewee female. Its columnists are also predominantly male. In fact, the only well-known exception to the males-dominate syndrome in the mainstream press, that I can think of, is Newsweek's Jane Bryant Quinn
In the market-letter publishing business, the writers and publishers are also overwhelmingly males. Of the many market letters I receive or have seen, the only females are Geraldine Weiss of Investment Quality Trends and the Aden sisters, who write primarily about the precious-metals markets.
Then we come to the Internet: pretty much the same story - there aren't very many female market commentators. And when we look at the currently-bearish Internet mavens, I don't see a single female among them. Me, Marc Sexton (Fiend SuperBear), David Tice and his employees (Prudent Bear), Bill Bonner (The Daily Reckoning), Alan Newman, Colin Seymour.... males, all of us. (If you know of a female bear who publishes on the Internet, please correct me.)
I have over 450 books on investing and related subjects in my library, and I checked them for female authors. I have an outdated set of Sylvia Porter's Money Book, Geraldine Weiss' Dividends Don't Lie, and an obscure tome on derivatives by Susan Ross Marki. That's it for the females.... all of the other 200-plus authors are male.
The Contrarian's View paid subscriber list is overwhelmingly male. There are a few joint (husband-and-wife) subscriptions.
So my question is, of course, what gives? What makes interest in investing pretty much the domain of males?
Is it because at one time all of the business world was reserved for males, and investment and finance is simply one of the last areas where females have penetrated? Perhaps that is part of the answer, but if it were sex discrimination alone, that does not explain the "maleness" of The Contrarian's View subscriber list, (nor, I suspect, the "maleness" of the subscriber lists of other investment letters).
I am reminded of a visit my wife and I made to friends in Daytona Beach, Florida several years ago. They had just bought a (used) boat and had invited us to take a cruise up the river. After we clambered aboard, the man attempted to get the boat to start up. The engine wouldn't catch. Muttering and cursing. Still wouldn't catch. Even more muttering and cursing.... and still wouldn't kick over. In the midst of the husband's fits of pique, the wife made a comment the exact words of which I've forgotten, but it was something like the prow of the boat being the extension of the man's penis. In other words, the boat was a manifestation of the husband's male ego. (Incidentally, the boat had run just fine the day before we arrived, and ran just fine after we had left.)
So, am I overstepping bounds in assuming that interest in the stock market is another manifestation of male ego? That men must "prove" their mastery over the stock market (good luck, you jerks) just as they frequently must demonstrate mastery in their jobs and (sometimes, with regrettable consequences) in their home lives? Meanwhile, women are perfectly content to step back and let the men slug it out with each other or with their environment while (if the women do invest) they just sit back and collect the profits?
And, to continue the questioning, do you suppose the "maleness" of interest in investing has biological roots, or is it learned behavior?
OK, at the risk of alienating every feminist reader, I'm going to stick
my neck out: I think it's a mixture of both biology and environment,
but probably more biological, with ingrained chromosomal differences
that extend back to prehistory. If any reader can prove me wrong,
please write or e-mail me.... let the flames begin!
By watching both the price of money (interest rates) and the quantity one can gain a key insight into market timing. While it is conventional wisdom interest rate hikes will depress stock markets or even send them into a tailspin both the crashes of 1929 and 1987 were preceded by significant jumps in interest rates recent events have shown that sharp changes in monetary growth can have a similar effects. So far monetary growth has slowed from the high rates seen at the turn of the year, but they have merely returned to levels seen over recent years. The conclusion is that so far the money supply is not signalling that the bubble is about to burst. - Robert C. B. Miller
To anticipate a bubble about to burst requires the forecast of a plunge in the prices of assets previously set by the judgments of millions of investors, many of whom are highly knowledgeable about the prospects for the specific investments that make up our broad price indexes of stocks and other assets. - Alan Greenspan [August 27, 1999]
The consensus of judgment of the millions whose valuations function on that admirable market, the Stock Exchange, is that stocks are not at present over-valued. Where is that group of men with all-embracing wisdom which will entitle them to veto the judgment of the intelligent multitude? - Joseph Lawrence [Princeton professor, 1929]
It is the proliferation of derivatives that allows unprecedented financial sector leveraging. At the same time, it is the financial sector that dominates the derivatives marketplace, both as the major buyers and sellers of derivative "insurance."... the continued expansion of derivative positions is not comforting. Yet, amazingly, perception holds that this market is functioning well and that all the major players are "hedged." Well, this is one of financial history's great myths, as it is simply impossible for the financial sector to "hedge" itself from the great risk created through reckless lending and leveraging. Admittedly, as long as rates do not move significantly higher, the perception can be maintained that this unfathomable amount of interest rate derivative "insurance" is valid. Or said another way, as long as there are no major "claims" on this "insurance" there is no problem. So, the precarious situation has developed that as long as the financial sector continues to lend and purchase securities aggressively perpetuating credit creation excess through continued financial sector leveraging the supply of credit will work to engender continued artificially low interest rates and general system liquidity. And as long as credit excess fuels rising asset prices, additional collateral "value" will foster additional borrowings. But this is a major TRAP, as any slowdown in financial sector credit creation will immediately cause a problematic imbalance between the supply and overheated demand for credit.... the resultant higher rates dramatically increase the probabilities that derivative "insurance" claims may actually be made, forcing players that have written the "insurance" to attempt to dynamically "hedge" their exposure by selling/shorting securities. This, obviously, leads only to less liquidity, higher rates, and heightened systemic risk in a dangerous feedback mechanism. - Doug Noland
Under the influence of the monetarists, most American economists hold the view that it lies in the hands of a central bank to prevent any.... bust from happening by simply "printing money." But by focusing narrowly on the banking system and the money supply, they overlook two snags. One is the monstrous scale of credit creation to which the U.S. economy and other one is the channel of this credit creation. Just as in the 1920s, it is overwhelmingly taking place outside of the banking system, through the financial markets Essentially, any disruption in these financial flows has the very same adverse effect on economic activity as a disruption in bank lending, irrespective of what is happening to the money supply. The usual pattern and early indicators of such disruptions are declining asset prices and widening interest rate spreads between papers of different quality. Considering the vast sums involved in the markets, it should be clear that the biggest danger to the U.S. economy looms in the financial markets, including the currency market and the derivatives markets. - Kurt Richebacher
The wavelike movement affecting the economic system, the recurrence of periods of boom which are followed by periods of depression, is the unavoidable outcome of the attempts, repeated again and again, to lower the gross market rate of interest by means of credit expansion. There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansions, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved. - Ludwig von Mises [in Human Action]
Japanese investors have provided a more recent example of how an infatuation with equities can turn to distaste. Bulls, remember, justified-sky high stock prices by arguing that the Japanese were not only avid savers, but also that their aging population would continue to fuel the boom. In addition, Japanese were allegedly tenacious long-term investors, and virtually precluded culturally, from going against the grain and selling stocks. Yet, the Japanese bubble burst. Afterwards, the Japanese did continue their aggressive savings habits. But having the financial wherewithal to buy stocks does not equate to bullishness. From 1989 to 1996, Japanese equity mutual funds assets contracted by more than 90 percent as prices sank and investors sold heavily. Even today, most Japanese investors would rather earn a paltry return from a savings account than accept the risk of investing in common stocks. - David Tice
Considering the still-booming economy and the reigning optimism about the economic outlook, the Federal Reserve responded in October-November 1929 with admirable promptness to the crash. On Nov. 1, when the selling panic was barely one week old, the Fed slashed the discount rate to 5% and a fortnight later to 4.5%. On Oct. 25, one day after Black Thursday, it had instantly reduced its buying rate on acceptances from 5 3/8% to 5%. This was followed by a rapid sequence of further cuts to 4% on Nov. 21. Yet the economy collapsed across the board with unprecedented and unbelievable rapidity like a house of cards. - Kurt Richebacher
You have to choose between trusting to the natural stability of gold and the natural stability of the honesty and intelligence of the members of the Government. And, with due respect for these gentlemen, I advise you, as long as the Capitalist system lasts, to vote for gold. - George Bernard Shaw
Now what good is a CONSUMER inflation indicator without food and energy? I guess I am a prima donna, as I have always lived under the assumption that without food and energy, I am dead. As someone who eats several times a day, needs to drive, and enjoys sleeping in a climate-controlled environment, I find it odd that increases in food and energy prices are not relevant enough to inflation to be considered "core". It is great to know the BLS feels non-essentials like food and energy can be divorced from the core inflation rate, as maybe one won't starve to death without food, and won't freeze to death without energy. - Adam Hamilton
In the end.... franchises in cyberspace will prove impossible. The internet is a great innovation that will advance by leaps and bounds. But it is fundamentally a destroyer of profits, as it takes hitherto scarce intellectual property and distributes it free of charge across the world wide web. In effect, the Internet eats its own. - Marshall Auerback
Our business plan called for us to build a small and profitable company, but we are a large and unprofitable company. That has been a conscious decision. We were profitable in December of 1995, but that is the worst mistake any company could have made. - Jeff Bezos [Amazon CEO]
The term medical marijuana took on dramatic new meaning in February when researchers in Madrid announced they had destroyed incurable brain cancer tumors in rats by injecting them with THC, the active ingredient in cannabis. The Madrid study marks only the second time that THC has been administered to tumor-bearing animals; the first was a Virginia investigation 26 years ago. In both studies, the THC shrank or destroyed tumors in a majority of the test subjects. - Raymond Cushing
Until 1969, virtually every public high school in New York City had a
shooting club. High-school students carried their guns to school on the
subways in the morning, turned them over to their homeroom teacher
or the gym coach and retrieved them after school for target practice.
The federal government gave club members their rifles and ammunition. Students regularly competed in citywide shooting contests for
university scholarships. Contrast that with what is happening today
across the country: college and elementary students expelled from
school for even accidentally bringing a water pistol; elementary school
students suspended for carrying a picture of a gun; kindergarten students suspended for playing cops and robbers and using their hands as
guns; a school superintendent losing his job for even asking whether
someone at a school should have a gun to protect the students.... The
horror with which people react to guns is inversely related to how
accessible guns are. Whether it was colonial times or 30 years ago,
people had more association with guns but less fear. Gun-control
advocates face something of a dilemma: If guns are the problem, why
was it that when guns were really accessible, even inside schools by
students, we didn't have the mass school shootings and other problems
that plague us now? - John R. Lott
INDICATOR PEAK DATE NYSE New Highs 631 10/3/97 NYSE Advance/Decline Line 13.00 4/3/98 Dow Transports 3783 5/12/99 NYSE Financials 584 5/13/99 Dow Utilities 333 6/16/99 Value Line-Geometric 472 7/6/99 NYSE Composite 663 7/16/99 Dow Industrials 11,722 1/14/00 Russell 2000 606 3/9/00 NASDAQ 5048 3/10/00 AMEX 1036 3/23/00 S&P 500 1527 3/24/00In other words, we're in a bear market, and have been so for some time, as one milestone after another tips from bull to bear. But until the (in my opinion, manipulated) popular averages begin to head south in a significant way, it's unlikely that the majority of investors, or the media, will acknowledge the bear. For example, in June, among the popular averages the Dow was essentially neutral and the NASDAQ was slightly positive; but on both the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges consistently more stocks have been declining than advancing, demonstrating the "internal rot" that is pressuring the majority of stocks downward, even though it's not reflected in the averages.
I expect the downward trend to become more obvious in July, and again in late September through mid-October, interrupted by a mid- and late-summer respite. These are the periods when "crashettes" are most likely to occur, but because this is a presidential election year I really don't expect to see a "crashette" (or full-blown crash) for the remainder of this year.
Nevertheless, I feel that one should exercise extreme caution in exposure to the stock market, not just because of the high-risk nature of the extreme levels of overvaluation (I could be wrong about those "crashettes", you know), but also because of the high level of systemic risk in the financial system generally.
My nightmare is: One day we wake up to find that some financial firm engulfed in derivatives gone bad is about to go under, and its losses are too great to be "bailed out" by Wall Street at the behest of the Federal Reserve, as was Long Term Capital Management in 1998. The Fed can't move fast enough to intervene directly, there is a surge in short term interest rates, and firms holding derivatives default in a snowballing chain reaction. In such a scenario the stock market is toast, of course.
The odds for such a scenario? Currently, probably fairly low. Nevertheless, once upon a time the world banking system was able to function without, for example, a 1982 bailout of Mexico, or infinite liquidity to counteract the 1987 Crash, or a 1997 bailout from the collapse of the Asian Tigers, or the 1998 bailout of LTCM. When I began investing years ago, there was no need for, and you didn't see, these massive bailouts. (The government may have bailed out corporations - Chrysler et al - but you didn't see the Federal Reserve engineering bailouts.) The fact they now seem to be necessary does not give me a warm feeling about the stability of the world's financial system, though there is no way of telling when a systemic problem will occur that can't be bailed out.
Is the fragility of the world's financial system cyclical.... that is, will we return to a period of sound currency and lending.... or is it human nature to take on increasing leverage and risk until someday the whole thing blows up in our faces? I lean toward the latter view, but not dogmatically, and we may not know the answer in my lifetime.
At any rate, I prefer my own strategy of investing where risk is historically low, not where it is historically high. That leaves me, at present,
in cash-equivalents and precious-metals stocks, with the hope that a good
bond-market opportunity will pop up within the next year.
Original cost (adjusted): $ 4,998.21
Present value: $ 3,977.54
Increase: $-1,010.67 [-20.42%]
The performance of this portfolio and its predecessors ("Hedger's Delight", "Present and Future Income", "Crapshooter's Folly") from January 1987 to the present is -9.76%, for a compound annual rate of return of -0.75%. COMMENT on "Phoenix": There is no change from the May issue.
B. "Professors' Investment Group (PIG)" - investment club portfolio.
SUMMARY - "PIG":
Original cost: $ 9,024.00
Present value: $15,126.98
Increase: $ 6,102.98 [+67.63%]
COMMENT on "PIG": An e-mail poll of all of the PIGs showed market opinions all over the place (with me the most bearish, of course).
So we compromised, and sold half of our positions in the high-tech
items, Alexion, Elan and Isis, locking in some nice profits. This gives
us cash to maybe deploy into more Barrick Gold or Prudent Bear, or
possibly just to sit on until the bear market has run its course and some
true high-tech bargains appear. In the meantime, those of us who are
market-wise will have to fight off those PIGs who adhere to the quaint
view that their special situations are so special that they will go up in a
bear market! Hey, we left half of their precious holdings just in case
we're wrong and one of them is a runaway winner, the new Microsoft.
The PIGs' Web page is at http://www.assumption.edu/HTML/Faculty/Kantar/WPigs.html
C. Roth rollover IRA - real portfolio, includes commissions:
SUMMARY - IRA:
Original (1983-86) cost: $ 8,326.19
Present value: $ 9,979.50
Increase: $ 1,653.51 [+19.86]
The performance of this portfolio (including its predecessors)
from January 1, 1987 to the present is -9.01%, for a compound
annual rate of return of -0.58%.
D. CREF Pension plan; I switch between indexed stock/bond/money funds:
Date Sold Bought
13Mar1992 stock @ 56.65 MM @ 13.41
29Apr1992 MM @ 13.48 bond @ 31.19
19Jun1992 bond @ 32.14 MM @ 13.55
29Jun1992 MM @ 13.57 stock @ 56.74
24Jul1992 stock @ 56.76 MM @ 13.61
29Oct1992 MM @ 13.72 stock @ 58.61
23Dec1992 stock @ 61.48 MM @ 13.78
16Jan1995 MM @ 14.83 equity-index @ 26.44
20Jan1995 eq-index @ 26.19 MM @ 14.84
30Oct1997 MM@ 17.24 bond@47.56 (27.17%)
30Oct1997 MM@ 17.24 i-i bond@26.12 (27.17%)
11Feb1998 bond@ 48.84 MM@17.52 (27.17%)
11Feb1998 I-I bond@ 26.23 MM@17.52(27.17%)
16Jun1998 MM@ 17.84 TIAA Traditional (45.87%)
23Sep1999 MM@18.99 I-I bond@27.56 (53.32%)
17-18May2000 rate adjustment to 7.25% in SRA
Values, 30Jun2000: stock, 206.09; MM, 19.83; bond, 53.38; inflation-indexed bond, 29.44;
TIAA current yield in SRA, 7.25%
Gain, 1988: 18.91%; 1989: 14.48%; 1990: 8.28%; 1991: 27.93%; 1992: 10.20%; 1993: 3.08%; 1994: 4.07%; 1995: 4.80%; 1996: 5.28%; 1997: 5.38%; 1998: 5.72%; 1999: 5.12%
Gain, January 1 through March 31, 2000: 3.029% (12.68% annual rate of return)
Total gain since January 1, 1988 (12.25 years): 196.77%
Compound annual rate of return: 9.29% (My long-term target: in excess of 15%)
Gain shown excludes the impact of additional monthly cash contributions.
Buying CREF stock on January 1, 1988 and holding it gained
556.04%, for a compound annual rate of return of 16.60%.
COMMENT on NYSE "Timer's Trend":
We saw some whipsawing this
past month, indicative of the NYSE's neutral trading range; currently,
we're on a BUY signal.
____________________________ NYSE TIMER'S TREND _______________________________
Mon 20 Mar 00 . & . |10680.24 |-. *
Tue 21 Mar 00 . I #. |10907.34 |+. *
Wed 22 Mar 00 . | #. |10866.70 |+. *
Thu 23 Mar 00 . | .# |11119.86 |+. *
Fri 24 Mar 00 . | #. |11112.72 | + *
Mon 27 Mar 00 . |# . |11025.85 | + *
Tue 28 Mar 00 . #I . |10936.11 |+. *
Wed 29 Mar 00 . # . |11018.72 |+. *
Thu 30 Mar 00 . |# . |10980.25 + . *
Fri 31 Mar 00 . | #. |10921.92 + . *
Mon 3 Apr 00 . | #. |11221.93 +~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tue 4 Apr 00 .# I . |11164.84 + . *
Wed 5 Apr 00 .# | . |11033.92 + . *
Thu 6 Apr 00 . | # |11114.27 + . *
Fri 7 Apr 00 . |# . |11111.48 + . *
Mon 10 Apr 00 . |# . |11186.56 + . *
Tue 11 Apr 00 . # . |11287.08 + . *
Wed 12 Apr 00 . |# . |11125.13 |+. *
Thu 13 Apr 00 # | . |10923.55 + . *
Fri 14 Apr 00 # . I . |10305.77 |~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mon 17 Apr 00 # I . |10582.51 | .- *
Tue 18 Apr 00 . & . |10767.42 | .- *
Wed 19 Apr 00 . #I . |10674.96 | .- *
Thu 20 Apr 00 . & . |10844.05 | .- *
Mon 24 Apr 00 .# I . |10906.10 |~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Tue 25 Apr 00 . | #. |11124.82 |-. *
Wed 26 Apr 00 . # . |10945.50 |-. *
Thu 27 Apr 00 . #I . |10888.10 |-. *
Fri 28 Apr 00 . # . |10733.91 |-. *
Mon 1 May 00 . | .# |10811.78 |+. *
Tue 2 May 00 . #| . |10731.12 + . *
Wed 3 May 00 # . I . |10480.13 |-.~~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 4 May 00 . #I . |10412.49 |-. *
Fri 5 May 00 . I #. |10577.86 |-. *
Mon 8 May 00 . I# . |10603.63 |-. *
Tue 9 May 00 .# I . |10536.75 |-. *
Wed 10 May 00 #. I . |10367.78 |-. *
Thu 11 May 00 . I #. |10545.97 |-. *
Fri 12 May 00 . I #. |10609.37 |-. *
Mon 15 May 00 . I .# |10807.78 + . *
Tue 16 May 00 . |# . |10934.57 |+. *
Wed 17 May 00 # I . |10769.74 |+. *
Thu 18 May 00 . #I . |10777.28 + . *
Fri 19 May 00 # . I . |10626.85 |-. *
Mon 22 May 00 #. I . |10542.55 | .- *
Tue 23 May 00 # I . |10422.27 | . - *
Wed 24 May 00 .# I . |10535.35 | . - *
Thu 25 May 00 # I . |10323.92 | . - *
Fri 26 May 00 .# I . |10299.24 | .- *
Tue 30 May 00 . I #. |10527.13 | - *
Wed 31 May 00 . I #. |10522.33 |-. *
Thu 1 Jun 00 . | .# |10652.20 +. *
Fri 2 Jun 00 . | . # }|10794.76 |+ *
Mon 5 Jun 00 . |# . |10815.30 |+ *
Tue 6 Jun 00 . |# . |10735.57 |+ *
Wed 7 Jun 00 . | #. |10812.86 |+ *
Thu 8 Jun 00 . #| . |10668.72 |+. *
Fri 9 Jun 00 . |# . |10614.06 +. *
Mon 12 Jun 00 . # . |10564.21 +. *
Tue 13 Jun 00 . | #. |10621.84 +. *
Wed 14 Jun 00 . | # |10687.95 |+. *
Thu 15 Jun 00 . # . |10714.82 |+. *
Fri 16 Jun 00 . #| . |10449.30 +. *
Mon 19 Jun 00 . |# . |10557.84 |+. *
Tue 20 Jun 00 . #| . |10435.16 +. *
Wed 21 Jun 00 . # . |10497.74 |-. *
Thu 22 Jun 00 . #I . {|10376.12 |-. *
Fri 23 Jun 00 # I . |10401.75 |-. *
Mon 26 Jun 00 . & . |10452.99 |-. *
Tue 27 Jun 00 . I# . |10524.46 |-. *
Wed 28 Jun 00 . |# . }|10527.29 |-. *
Thu 29 Jun 00 . |# . |10398.04 +. *
Fri 30 Jun 00 . #| . |10447.89 +. *
========================================================================
COMMENT on NASDAQ "Timer's Trend": The trend continues down since I began tracking
this on February 28, 2000.
____________________________ NASDAQ TIMER'S TREND ____________________________ Mon 3 Apr 00 # . I . | 4223.68 |~*~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Tue 4 Apr 00 # . I . | 4148.89 @| . - * Wed 5 Apr 00 #. I . | 4169.22 @| . - * Thu 6 Apr 00 . I# . | 4267.56 | . - * Fri 7 Apr 00 . I #. | 4446.45 | .- * Tue 11 Apr 00 # . I . | 4055.90 | .- * Wed 12 Apr 00 # . I . | 3769.63 |~.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Thu 13 Apr 00 # . I . | 3676.78 | . - * Fri 14 Apr 00 # . I . | 3321.29 @|~.~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mon 17 Apr 00 #. I . | 3539.16 @| . - * Tue 18 Apr 00 . & . | 3793.57 @|~.~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Wed 19 Apr 00 #. I . | 3706.41 | . - * Thu 20 Apr 00 # . I . | 3643.88 | . - * Mon 24 Apr 00 # . I . | 3482.48 |~*~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Tue 25 Apr 00 . I #. | 3711.23 | .- * Wed 26 Apr 00 # I . | 3630.09 | . - * Thu 27 Apr 00 . #I . | 3774.03 | .- * Fri 28 Apr 00 . I# . | 3860.66 |~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~* Mon 1 May 00 . I #. | 3958.08 + . * Tue 2 May 00 #. I . | 3785.45 |-. * Wed 3 May 00 # . I . | 3707.31 | - * Thu 4 May 00 .# I . | 3720.24 | - * Fri 5 May 00 . & . | 3816.82 | .- * Mon 8 May 00 #. I . | 3669.38 | . - * Tue 9 May 00 # . I . | 3585.01 |~.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Wed 10 May 00 # . I . | 3384.73 |~.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Thu 11 May 00 . #I . | 3499.58 | . - * Fri 12 May 00 . #I . | 3529.06 | . - * Mon 15 May 00 . & . | 3607.65 | .- * Tue 16 May 00 . I # | 3717.57 | - * Wed 17 May 00 # . I . | 3644.96 |-. * Thu 18 May 00 #. I . | 3538.71 | - * Fri 19 May 00 # . I . | 3390.40 | .- * Mon 22 May 00 # . I . | 3364.21 | . - * Tue 23 May 00 # . I . | 3164.55 @|~.*~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Wed 24 May 00 #. I . | 3270.61 @| . - * Thu 25 May 00 # . I . | 3205.35 @| . - * Fri 26 May 00 # . I . | 3205.11 @| . - * Tue 30 May 00 . I# . | 3459.48 | . - * Wed 31 May 00 # I . | 3400.91 | . - * Thu 1 Jun 00 . I # | 3582.50 |~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~* Fri 2 Jun 00 . I . # | 3813.38 +. * Mon 5 Jun 00 . I# . | 3821.76 |+. * Tue 6 Jun 00 . & . | 3756.37 |+. * Wed 7 Jun 00 . |# . | 3839.26 |+ * Thu 8 Jun 00 . & . | 3825.56 |+. * Fri 9 Jun 00 . | # | 3874.84|+.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~* Mon 12 Jun 00 .# I . | 3767.91 +. * Tue 13 Jun 00 . & . | 3851.06 +. * Wed 14 Jun 00 . #I . | 3797.41 +. * Thu 15 Jun 00 . #I . | 3845.64 |-. * Fri 16 Jun 00 . & . | 3860.56 |-. * Mon 19 Jun 00 . I# . | 3989.83 |-. * Tue 20 Jun 00 . I# . | 4013.36 +. * Wed 21 Jun 00 . I# . | 4064.01 +. * Thu 22 Jun 00 . & . | 3936.84 +. * Fri 23 Jun 00 # . I . | 3845.34 |-. * Mon 26 Jun 00 . & . | 3912.12 |-. * Tue 27 Jun 00 .# I . | 3858.96 |- * Wed 28 Jun 00 . I #. | 3940.34 |-. * Thu 29 Jun 00 # I . | 3877.23 |- * Fri 30 Jun 00 . I #. | 3966.11 |-. * ========================================================================"Timer's Trend" is based on 4% and 10% exponential moving averages of the New York Stock Exchange advance/decline line (that is, the ratio of advancing to declining stocks). There are many symbols shown above, but the ones that count are the braces: {, } = "Timer's Trend" (4% exponential confirmed by 10% exponential) SELL ({) or BUY(}) signal.
NEXT ISSUE - the so-called "July" issue may appear as late as early September. I expect a quiet summer; why waste an issue on the doldrums, when the markets are much more likely to be interesting after Labor Day, after vacations have ended, the elections are approaching, and when a "crashette" is more likely to occur? (There is no August issue, nor has there ever been; the "July" issue merely might appear very late.)
/Nick Chase