The Contrarian's View,
Vol. I, #5, December 15, 1986
- FORECAST '87 -
My contrarian nature wants me to publish a year-ahead forecast in July
(or even better, August) when nobody else is doing it. But the desire to
compete with other market soothsayers, and compare my forecast with theirs
in early 1988, is just too great. So here I am, joining the thundering
herd, with my forecast for the year ahead. (But it still goes against my
grain.)
Well, perhaps FORECAST is the wrong word to use.... it might be better to
say, here are some POSSIBLE OUTCOMES for the year ahead. After all, if I
really knew in advance what the future will bring, I wouldn't be spending
my time writing this letter.
Before we look ahead into 1987, we need first to see how unusual 1986 was.
There were five major events which drove stock prices higher this past year.
They were:
1. Most important, agressive printing of money and lowering of interest
rates by the Federal Reserve. (Short-term interest rates declined
almost 3% during 1986.)
2. The collapse in oil prices, which reduced energy costs.
3. A deliberate, and successful, effort to lower the value of the
dollar in relation to foreign currencies.
4. Low commodity prices and no visible resurgence of inflation, as
measured by the Consumer Price Index.
5. Tax "reform".
Similarly, there were no real negatives for 1986.... no foreign loan
defaults, no massive bank failures, no loss of confidence in the system.
The only bummer was that business wasn't all that good.
What made 1986 unusual is that all of the above influences came together,
mostly in the first half of the year, to produce an incredible euphoria in
the markets and drive prices to unforeseen highs. Although easy money still
holds stock prices (at least in the blue chips) high, euphoria appears to
have peaked last July.
Now, as we peer into 1987, what are the things that could possibly go right,
and those that could possibly go wrong?
POSSIBLE BULLISH EVENTS:
* The Federal Reserve continues its easy money policy, energy prices remain
low, and business finally picks up. Earnings rise, and the high prices of
stocks can be more easily justified.
* The decline in the dollar stimulates exports, adding to the pickup in
business.
* The lower marginal rates of tax "reform" and the increased cash in
consumers' pockets unleash an orgy of productive energy, and a new boom
is underway.
* Consumer confidence continues at high levels; consumers continue to
increase their borrowing at a high rate, fueling the boom.
* For reasons nobody really understands, there is no pickup in the rate of
inflation. Inflation remains low (at least by recent standards).
POSSIBLE BEARISH EVENTS:
* The Federal Reserve realizes it's running out of maneuvering room. If it
continues its easy money policies, it may precipitate a sharp drop in the
dollar's value on international currency markets, which would force it to
slam on the monetary brakes really hard. So the Fed decides that risking
a "little" recession in 1987 is preferable to a "big" recession later on,
and it slows down the printing presses a bit. Not much, just enough to
firm up interest rates and keep them stable, rather than declining. After
all, the 1986 Congressional elections are over, so it's better to have a
little pain and suffering now, then return to an easier-money policy in
time for the 1988 Presidential election.
* Tax "reform" has some unexpected side effects: Consumers use the 6% extra
cash from their tax "cuts" to pay off debt, rather than buy more goods
and services. Because interest on consumer debt is no longer tax-deducti-
ble, consumers cut back on borrowing (and spending), sending the economy
into recession. Both individuals and businesses spend considerable time,
effort and money "shifting gears" to adjust to the new tax system; this
burden is in effect a hidden tax increase (except for accountants, who
are smiling all the way to the bank).
Where possible, individuals defer income to 1988 to avoid the 1987
"blended" tax rate, and accelerate expenses to 1986 or 1987. Suddenly,
"reform" is no longer tax-neutral, but tax-negative, and the deficit
grows. Businesses suffer under a higher tax rate; as much as possible,
the cost of higher taxes is passed on to consumers in higher prices.
The IRS cannot write new rules or reprogram its computers in time to
properly implement the new law; confusion reigns supreme as many "gray
area" questions remain unanswered.
Dissatisfaction peaks in the spring of 1988, when taxpayers filling out
their returns suddenly realize that the "blended" rates of 1987 have
actually raised taxes for many of them, and that the new law and tran-
sition rules are so complex that one's tax return is almost impossible
to fill out. The average itemized return has doubled in length; Schedule
A alone, formerly a single page, has now grown to two and a half pages
long. People wonder who the turkeys were that voted for this thing in
the first place; citizens become intensely unhappy with their government
"rulers", especially when Congress makes noises about raising the tax
rates. Whatever happened to the SIMPLIFICATION?
* With the dollar weak, foreigners (who have taken quite a beating in U.S.
securities since March of 1985) decide to stop buying our government
bonds. We taxpayers now have to finance our own national debt, rather
than export it. Interest rates rise as government borrowing crowds out
private borrowing, in spite of the Fed's easy money policy and the re-
duced private demand for credit resulting from tax "reform". Also, the
prices of imports, which usually lag a dollar decline by one to two
years, now rise sharply. With commodity prices firming, and the price of
oil stable, inflation returns; gold rises from $380 to $620 per ounce.
* Mexico, which is undergoing yet another recession, says, "Look, folks. We
all know that Mexico can't repay the money you lent us. We can't even pay
you the interest on the money you lent. Why don't we just forget that you
ever lent us the money?" Well, the Mexicans don't use those exact words,
but you get the idea. This triggers an international banking crisis of
major proportions. As lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve engineers
a massive bank bailout; your savings are safe, but the dollar suddenly
buys 30% less. The shareholders of the money-center banks are wiped out,
of course. The stock market first nosedives in a panic, then surges to new
highs in a hyperinflationary binge.
* Although the Fed's monetary policy remains easy, consumers (prodded by the
antiborrowing bias of tax reform) decide to pare down their debts.... or
at least, not to take on additional debt at the blistering pace of the
last two years. With consumer spending off, business declines.... a re-
cession is underway.
* The defaults and depression in the oil patch and the farm belt have a
"rolling snowball" effect. Slowly, then more quickly, the condition
spreads into the rest of the economy. The public turns pessimistic....
a recession is underway.
THE OUTLOOK:
The frightening thing about these possible bullish and bearish events is
that any one of them (or even some combination of them) looks like it could
easily happpen. No doubt this explains the schizophrenic nature of most 1987
forecasts, which range anywhere from total economic collapse to a great
year.
What we're seeing, of course, are the symptoms, not the disease. The
"disease", in this case, is that the post-World War II credit expansion has
reached (indeed, has probably exceeded) the limits at which one can reason-
ably expect it will be repaid by future generations. I think we actually
reached the limits at the beginning of the 80s. Since then, net credit ex-
pansion appears to have taken place because the purchasing power of the
dollar has declined; but in real terms there's been no increase. (When
measuring something, it's wise not to use a rubber ruler.)
The Fed's easy money policy keeps the economy afloat, but because the in-
creased liquidity does not directly replace defaulted debt, there are dis-
tortions. That is why virtual depressions in oil and agriculture can coexist
with low interest rates, a housing boom, and leveraged buyouts of corpora-
tions at high prices. On balance, though, the defaulted farm and oil loans,
and the de-facto defaults of foreign loans, more than offset the increase
in consumer, business and government debt.
History gives us many examples of nations that have borrowed their way to
prosperity. Unfortunately for us, history offers NO examples of nations
which have maintained their prosperity indefinitely through ever-increasing
borrowing. The building of a credit pyramid invariably is followed by a
period of no net credit growth, then a decline in credit, as the ability of
present and future generations to shoulder the debt burden becomes suspect.
We seem to be entering a period now where the government, as creditor of
last resort, will guarantee the debts of troubled banks, companies and
foreign nations rather than risk a chain reaction of defaults. (Plus, in-
creasing its own debt at $200 billion per year!) When the U.S. government
"owns" all the bad debt, it can then massively depreciate the currency
(that is, hyperinflate) and in effect steal away your savings to repay the
debt in worthless dollars. Then we can start the credit-pyramid-building
process all over again.
Now, where does all of this leave us for 1987? After I mull over the possi-
bilities, here is what I expect for the coming year:
I expect the Federal Reserve will print money at a slower rate in 1987....
at least, for the first half of the year. After all, the next Presidential
election isn't until 1988, so why not take a few economic lumps next year,
when the political damage can be contained? Mind you, I don't expect a
drastic tight money policy, but merely a slowing in the money growth rate
from 17% for 1986, to perhaps 9%-11% for 1987.
Consumers, who have already begun to turn less optimistic, will trim their
spending (especially, because of tax "reform", debt-financed spending) in
1987. The economy will tip into recession in the latter half of the year.
Exports will pick up in 1987. So will interest rates and inflation. The
Fed's less-loose monetary policy, plus the unwillingness of foreigners
to continue financing our ballooning budget deficits, will put pressure on
short-term interest rates, which should clearly be rising by next spring.
The decline of the dollar, plus the great quantity of money printed during
the past three years should also, finally, translate into higher prices
by the spring.
Although I can't predict the timing, the odds are rapidly increasing that
the world financial system will start to come unglued sometime in 1987,
perhaps later in the year as the recession takes hold. The politicians
will adopt the only "solution" available to them; more printing-press
money! A hyperinflationary binge is the inevitable result of such folly.
All of this translates into a down year for the stock market in 1987. I
would expect tax-loss selling to depress prices in January; then a brief
rally would carry the market upward into early spring. The divergence
between the blue chip stocks (which are heavily arbitraged) and the general
market will continue into the spring, when I would expect the blue chips
to "catch up" with the rest of the market by declining sharply. After that,
it's all downhill for the stock market, probably until the fall, when
the Federal Reserve panics to avoid a global financial crisis, and again
speeds up the money printing presses. Parts of the 1987 decline, being
aggravated by arbitrage-related selling, could be truly spectacular....
something like the bear markets of 1962 or 1970, for those old enough to
remember those market selloffs.
The timing of stock market cycles can never be precise, because the cycles
result from the waxing and waning of investor sentiment which is, in turn,
strongly influenced by largely-unpredictable (but politically-influenced)
economic events. I can only observe that if implementation does not manage
to live up to expectation, then disillusionment, perhaps even despair, is
sure to result. Each of 1986's major economic events has negative, if some-
what delayed, aftereffects:
* Easy money.... a declining dollar, foreigners unwilling to buy our
debt, leading to higher interest rates;
* Oil prices.... a spreading depression in the domestic petroleum in-
dustry;
* Tax "reform".. more complexity, more government intrusion into indi-
vidual affairs, less individual freedom, less saving
and investment, reduced consumer spending.
With a lag of one to two years between the euphoria existing when the
above events occurred.... mainly in the first half of 1986.... and the
period of maximum disillusionment, in my opinion 1987 is likely to be
a year of increasing pessimism, as the "chickens come home to roost".
This pessimism will, of course, be reflected in the financial markets
as well as in the health of the economy.
- WORTH INVESTIGATING -
Saxon Oil Development Limited Partnership (SAX, $.63, American Exchange) has
implemented a unique solution to excessive debt in the face of declining oil
prices: Dilute the partners' equity!
In August, with 4.9 million units outstanding and with almost $3 per unit of
debt, Saxon was quickly headed the way of many other MLPs.... into bankrupt-
cy, as declining oil and gas prices shrank cash flow, and income barely cov-
ered debt service. So last summer Saxon issued rights.... four rights per
unit, each being the right to buy a unit at $.625 each. This was effectively
a 5:1 stock split; the quarterly dividend was also reduced from $.10 to $.02
to reflect the dilution. But, assuming all the rights are exercised, look
what happens to the debt! After dilution, book value per unit is about 63
cents, and total debt is only 13 cents. This allows Saxon to pass through
the cash flow to its limited partners instead of the banks. Will the 2-cent
quarterly dividend be maintained? Probably.... depending on gas and oil
prices. I am strongly considering some of these limited partnership units
for the "Crapshooter's Folly" portfolio.
- PORTFOLIO REVIEW -
A. "Hedger's Delight" - model portfolio, includes commissions:
11Dec86
Shrs Description Bought Sold On Sold At Cost Is Value
---- ------------------------------ ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
100 Bally Manuf wt$40/4Jan88 SHORT 30Oct85 281.23 -212.50
1 Bally Manuf 15Sep98cvbd 60.00 2Oct85 795.00 915.00
20 Computer Consoles SHORT 12Jun86 186.74 -170.00
1 Computer Con 15Feb98cvbd 77.50 24Sep85 685.00 780.00
1 Eastern Air L 1Oct93cvbd 47.50 11Sep85 625.00 538.75
100 Golden Nugget SHORT 28Feb86 1390.67 -962.50
100 Golden Nugget wt$18/1Jul88 28Feb86 357.50 137.50
50 Integrated Resources SHORT 16May85 913.10 -1081.25
15 Integrated Resources SHORT 11Jun85 296.50 -324.38
45 Integrated Resources cvpf 4.25 17Apr85 1560.51 1732.50
25 Integrated Resources cvpf 4.25 15May85 847.50 962.50
30 Integrated Resources cvpf 4.25 11Jun85 1031.13 1155.00
200 Keystone Camera Products SHORT 12Jun86 1023.86 -1150.00
300 Keystone Camra wt$8.25/20Mar90 11Jun86 330.00 262.50
200 McLean Industries SHORT 5Dec85 1777.90 -275.00
200 McLean Industrs wt9.45/15Jul90 5Dec85 510.00 31.25
165 Pier 1 Inc. SHORT 12Nov85 1663.24 -2887.50
82 Pier 1 Inc. SHORT 23Jan86 931.95 -1435.00
100 Pier 1 wt$22/15Jul88 12Nov85 585.00 2375.00
12 Ridgewood Properties (A) SHORT 12Nov85 252.00 -285.00
100 Safeguard Scientifics SHORT 22Nov85 1010.47 -1500.00
20 Safeguard Scientifics SHORT 6Dec85 222.74 -300.00
100 Safeguard Scient wt$12/30Jun87 18Sep85 220.00 400.00
100 Spendthrift Farms SHORT 9Dec85 341.83 -93.75
100 Spendthrift Farms SHORT 10Dec85 341.83 -93.75
500 Spendthrift Farms wt$9/15Mar89 6Dec85 240.63 62.50
200 Wickes wt$4.43/26Jan92 SHORT 28Aug85 427.48 -450.00
50 Wickes wt$4.43/26Jan92 SHORT 6Feb86 104.06 -112.50
280 Wickes Companies (B) 28Aug85 1226.13 1050.00
CASH 160.00 160.00
(A) Pier 1 distribution; (B) 7:1 conversion ------- ------- --------
of $2.50 preferred. 11159.92 9173.40 -770.63
SUMMARY - "Hedger's Delight":
Original cost: $ 9,398.02
Present value: $10,389.29
Increase (decrease): $ 991.27 (10.55%)
COMMENT on "Hedger's Delight": I have specified no trades in this portfolio
for the past month, but the value is slightly greater, due primarily to the
collapse of the common stock prices of two warrant/common hedges, McLean
Industries and Spendthrift Farms. McLean declared bankruptcy in November;
the latest quarterly loss wiped out the remaining shareholder's equity.
Spendthrift still has the bankruptcy wolves at bay, but probably not for
long. The founder and chairman of Spendthrift, who came out of retirement
to try to rescue the company, has just "retired" again. That leaves the
financier in charge of the operation. What do financiers know about horse
breeding? Not very much.... "The only way most people go out of the horse
business is that they go broke", said Robert Hagopian, the new Spendthrift
person-in-charge as quoted in the November 4, 1986 Wall Street Journal.
How true.
With the McLean and Spendthrift Farms hedges near their maximum profit
potential, I am investigating other warrant/common hedges. So far I haven't
found any I like, but I'll keep looking. Also this month, the portfolio's
cash has increased with the Integrated Resources preferred quarterly divi-
dend payment.
B. "Future Income" - includes commissions:
11Dec86
Shrs Description Bought Sold On Sold At Cost Is Value
---- ------------------------------ ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
1 Apache Pet 15Jul2001cvbd 90.00 26Sep86 914.06 650.00
20 McDermott Inter'l wt$25/1Apr90 31Mar86 41.25 60.00
100 Mesa Petroleum 6Feb86 275.00 375.00
50 MSA Realty wt$9/1Apr89 7Feb85 89.38 100.00
50 Public Service NH wt$5/15Oct91 22Jan85 96.25 206.25
20 Triton Energy wt $21.36/15No89 8Dec86 77.00 65.00
50 Varity wt$3.60/31May91 31Mar86 24.07 21.88
------- ------- --------
1517.01 1478.13
SUMMARY - "Future Income":
Original cost: $ 1,544.20
Present value: $ 1,478.13
Increase (decrease): $ -66.07 (-4.28%)
Yield: $ 90.00 (6.13%)
COMMENT on "Future Income": I've added 20 Triton Energy warrants this month,
exercisable at $21.36 before November 15, 1989. Triton (whose common and
convertible preferred stocks trade on the NYSE) is a rapidly-growing oil
company, if you can believe that such a creature can exist during a de-
pression in the petroleum industry. The company has good cash flow with
which it can fund future dividends. If the oil depression ends within the
next three years, this company should profit handsomely. The warrants are
callable at $6.375 each if the common stock should ever trade at a price of
$30.80 more for any 20 days within a period of 30 consecutive trading days.
For the big splurger, the Triton 13.5%/1994 bonds are usable at face value
in exercising these warrants. The common, presently $15, is trading close
to its per-share book value.
C. "Crapshooter's Folly" - includes commissions:
11Dec86
Shrs Description Bought Sold On Sold At Cost Is Value
---- ------------------------------ ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
10 BancTexas cvpf 1.46 (div susp) 21Apr86 44.00 12.50
50 Campbell Resrc wt$4.40/31Dec88 11Sep85 6.00 6.25
50 Damson Energy Partners Class A 8Jul86 116.88 46.88
100 Damson Energy Partners Class B 17Jul86 206.25 87.50
100 Energy Developmt wt$20/31Mar87 31Mar86 13.75 3.13
100 Entex Energy Development .60 25Jul86 477.50 362.50
100 Entex Energy Development .60 30Jul86 371.25 362.50
100 USX wt$42/15Sep88 6Oct86 68.75 46.88
100 USX wt$42/15Sep88 21Nov86 41.25 46.88
CASH 50.00 50.00
------- ------- --------
1395.63 1006.27
SUMMARY - "Crapshooter's Folly":
Original cost: $ 1,345.63
Present value: $ 1,006.27
Increase (decrease): $ -339.36 (-25.22%)
Yield: $ 120.00 (8.92%)
COMMENT on "Crapshooter's Folly": This month's crapshoot is for another 100
of the USX warrants. Also this past month: Entex Energy Development paid a
$50 distribution (a return of capital), at a $1.00 annual rate. Next year
the distribution declines to a $.60 annual rate, due to the decline in oil
and gas prices.
D. IRA 1 - real portfolio: Twentieth Century
11Dec86
Shares Description Bought Sold On Sold At Cost Is Value
-------- ------------------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
2.7410 VISTA 8Mar84 11.32 18.97
5.8240 VISTA 21Mar84 25.10 40.30
1.3680 VISTA 31Aug84 6.50 9.47
.0670 VISTA 12Jan85 .29D .46
1.6630 Cash Reserves 12Jun86 166.28 166.28
.0050 Cash Reserves 30Jun86 .50I .50
.0080 Cash Reserves 31Jul86 .80I .80
.0080 Cash Reserves 31Aug86 .80I .80
.0070 Cash Reserves 30Sep86 .70I .70
E: IRA 2 - real portfolio: Bull & Bear
905.8000 Dollar Reserves 16Jun86 900.80 900.80
.9000 Dollar Reserves 30Jun86 .90I .90
2.4000 Dollar Reserves 15Jul86 2.40 2.40
4.5600 Dollar Reserves 31Jul86 4.56I 4.56
4.0800 Dollar Reserves 29Aug86 4.08I 4.08
4.1700 Dollar Reserves 30Sep86 4.17I 4.17
3.9700 Dollar Reserves 31Oct86 3.97I 3.97
3.5600 Dollar Reserves 28Nov86 3.56I 3.56
--------- --------
$ 1138.73 1162.72
SUMMARY - IRA 1 and 2:
Original cost: $ 952.62
Present value: $ 1,162.72
Increase (decrease): $ 210.10 (22.05%)
COMMENT on IRAs: "Timer's Trend" gave a SELL signal on Tuesday, December 9.
But there is no change in the IRA portfolio since the last issue (other than
interest received), as the portfolio is already 94% in cash and only 6% in
stocks.
___________________________ TIMER'S TREND ______________________________
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NEXT ISSUE - will appear about January 12, 1987.
/Nick Chase